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External Impact Requires National Response
The generality of economic debacles in Sub-Saharan African 
economies,since 1975 for mineral exporters and since 1977 
for others,suggests that the dominant causes of sustained 
recession and increasing disintegration are - in a majority 
cf cases - external. The structures, histories and policies 
of the now crisis ridden SSA economies vary so widely, the 
downturns have been so sudden and the ability to recover so 
limited (unlike the 1973-75 crisis period) as to make assertions 
about general, dominant domestic policy causes somewhat 
implausible.
External shocks reduce domestic efficiency
For example lower export purchasing power causes lower imports, 
lower capacity utilisation in manufacturing, erosion of the 
tax base on domestic manufacturers, lack of 'incentive goods' 
for farmers to buy. It also means extra work for policy 
makers and analysts, for import managers and allocators, for 
productive unit managers scrabbling desperately for fuel, for 
spares, for transport, for local and imported inputs. In 
many SSA economies nothing would increase policy and managerial 
performance so much or so rapidly as a reduction in the import 
capacity (or foreign exchange) constraint.
However, the dominance of external causes - still less debates 
about whether their direct and indirect impact to any specific 
country's crisis is 50% or 75% or 99% - must not be seen as 
justifying a call for an external cure:
1. if the world economic setting has changed national policies 
and relations to the altered external economic context must 
change;
2. the buoyant world economy of 1945-69 cannot be whistled back 
into existence - even its transitory partial reappearance
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over 1976-78 is beyond reach - and assertions to the 
contrary serve SSA very ill;
3. nor is there any real plausibility to hopes for a break­
through on North/South negotiations either on structure or 
on massive transfers. The Brandt Report's strategy for 
survival had and has much to commend it but it has not 
itself survived the forces massed against it.
In policy review three dangers must be guarded against:
A. Radical back and forth shifts at short intervals with 
high disruption costs and no perseverance for long enough 
to bear fruit;
B. Resolute drifting or refusal to take and act on any policy 
decisions;
C . Grim dedication to particular policies which may or may
not have been sound when adopted but can no longer function.
The price of alternating rapid chopping and changing with 
resolute irresolution for decades is grimly illustrated by 
Ghana and Argentina.
Starting Where We are
No policy maker has the option of starting where he wishes 
he were today much less where he aspires to be in 20 years 
time. Nor can he alter the past to change where he has 
arrived. Time past and time future are contained in time 
present. Time past is only redeemable by understanding and 
acting on it in the present to alter the future. Time future 
can only be altered by acting here and now. Courses not taken 
and the paths to which they would have led remain possibilities 
only in speculation and abstraction.
Analysis of past alternatives and of future goals from which 
to chart direction is essential. But it must not be allowed 
to mystify suggesting that will and desire can evade or over­
come the necessity of starting where we are.
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There can be no long term unless we grapple successfully 
with the short, no first arrival unless we take the first 
steps - and take them in the right direction. In Africa where 
we are is in crisis - in the political economy not of autonomous 
development or of dependent development but in the majority of 
cases in the political economy of deepening stagnation/ incipient 
or actual disintegration.
That means that the first imperative is to consolidate, to 
regroup - in a word to survive. Only when that is done can a 
forward dynamic be resumed. Failure to begin consolidation and 
regrouping now will mean more and more collapsed economies like 
Ghana and Uganda for whom the barriers even to halting the 
dynamic of decline, still more to real consolidation and most of 
all to restored growth even to where they were in 1960 and 
1970 respectively are very high and craggy indeed.
Consolidation has four priorities:
a. maintaining the core of existing productive, infrastructural 
and human capital stock (in installations, institutions and 
human beings);
b . rehabilitating critical elements of the economy's and society's 
capital stock which are run down (e.g. cocoa in Ghana, railways 
in Zambia, rural water facilities in Tanzania);
c . maintaining or raising the rate of utilisation of existing 
capacity - in agriculture, in transport, in manufacturing, in 
basic services;
d. identifying and closing gaps (in infrastructure or production 
chains or basic services) which critically hamper achieving the 
first three priorities.
The achievement of these four tasks can lay a foundation for new 
advances (whether on the previous basic national political 
economic project, a revised or a radically altered one). Until 
that foundation is laid trying to restore a rapid development 
dynamic is like laying brick walls on quicksand.
To be concrete consolidation means more imports of spares
and chemicals for textile factories and less or no new factories
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and capacity expansion, more spares for existing rural 
water projects and a slowdown in new capital/import 
intensive one's establishment, more parts for lorries 
and less new lorries. Of course selection is needed - 
spares for tractors which have always been underutilised 
and uneconomic and whose potential viability has been wiped 
out by oil price increases and reduced import capacity are 
as much of a nonsense as manufacturing plants dedicated 
on day one and closed for lack of imported inputs on day 
two. The basic point - and one which has only been partially 
realised and even more partially acted on by SSA governments 
or external donors - is that priority must go to operating 
maintaining and rehabilitating what exists.
How does the principle of starting where we are and consolidating 
to build a foundation for renewed advance relate to externally 
oriented, export led growth strategies (as quite explicitly 
advocated on the World Bank's Agenda for Action) and to what 
I will call National Political Economic Integration Strategies 
(whose regional context and twenty year goals are sketched in the 
OAU's Lagos Plan)?
Export Led Growth
Primary product export led growth is a high risk, low payoff 
strategy. It will only benefit its practitioners if one country 
in ten follows it. The growth rate prospects and price 
elasticities for most of Africa's traditional exports are 
dismal in the extreme (a projection on which the Bank and 
UNCTAD are in close agreement). The 50% deterioration of the 
terms of trade for many African exports since the early 1970's 
(over 67% since 1977 for coffee, tea and cocoa) is now projected 
to continue for the 198Q's as a whole.
Those projections assume continued low growth of African exports. 
Given the low price elasticities were SSA exports of these 
products to rise rapidly African economies would receive less - 
not more - foreign exchange. For coffee if an African country 
raises its rate of export growth for every kroner of exports
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it gains other African exporters will lose one and a half 
and all other coffee exporters taken together about five.
At bottom the primary export led growth theme - at least for 
the 1980's - rests on a simple fallacy of composition.
Export led growth based on manufacturing might be more 
desirable and promising - only might since the rapid increase 
of industrial economy protectionism against Third World 
manufactured exports from garments through instant coffee to 
steel gives ground for doubt. But for SSA in the 1980's 
it is not practicable.
The main successful exporters of manufacturers to break into 
the world market in the 1970's did so either on the basis 
of cheap labour tied to a commercial tradition, cheap capital 
and first rate infrastructure>or on the basis of a 30 or 40 
year inward looking development of a broad manufacturing 
sector backed and guided by detailed state intervention which 
then shifted to selective export promotion. As no SSA 
economies have low labour costs, cheap capital, first rate 
infrastructure (except perhaps Mauritius) the first route 
is a non starter. The second - that of Brazil, of the Republic 
of Korea and of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea is 
more interesting, more relevant and more like what some African 
industrial strategies have sought to achieve. But, however 
well or ill designed and implemented these strategies none 
is over fifteen years old versus the 30 to 40 years historical 
experience suggests is required to build a strong enough, broad 
enough industrial sector. In the 1990's perhaps for a few 
economies (e.g. Zimbabwe, Nigeria, even Tanzania) not in 1980's.
National Political Economic Integration
The past record of limited burstsof growth turning to stagnation - 
and in the present crisis decline - demonstrate the desireability 
(or even in most cases necessity) of national political economic 
integration (or self reliance, or delinking or economic liberation 
the terms overlap and the variants within each are numerous) 
strategies. They further increase the case for attempting them 
in a regional context.
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If rapid domestic growth pulled along by still more rapid 
export growth is not possible what alternative is there to 
domestic (internal) oriented production and market expansion 
as the leading force? If the Balance of Payments constraint 
chokes off growth and export increases are hard to come by, 
is there any option other than increasing domestic production 
and use linkages to allow higher levels of national production 
at any achieved level of exports? If radical instability 
(or prolonged decline) of export markets and terms of trade 
imposes major shock and start/stop costs,is it not critical 
to reduce the degree of dependence on exports and imports 
as insurance and as a means to broaden alternative practicable 
economic choices?
But the crisis not only makes nei strategies seem more 
desirable - it also makes them much harder to begin or 
where begun in the late 1960's to sustain. Real national 
purchasing power per person (physical output per person 
corrected for loss of export purchasing power in terms of 
imports) is declining for a majority of SSA economies; a 
poor market base for internally oriented expansion. Import 
constraints block use of existing and building of new capacity; 
a far from ideal resource availability position for building 
up intermediate and capital goods production and developing 
new agricultural and natural resource based primary production 
as inputs into domestic production.
The first thing an nei strategy based on genuine economic 
structure transformation requires is an absolute increase 
in imports. In small economies it often requires an increase 
in the ratio of imports to national production (e.g. People's 
Democratic Republic of Korea but not Brazil). Certainly this 
is likely for economies needing to import most of their fuel 
and capital goods - the condition of most SSA economies through­
out the 1980's (no matter how hard they explore for oil or 
how rapidly they expand their very small construction materials 
and machinery/engineering goods production).
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In brutal fact the crises has hit those economies with 
moderately well advanced nei strategics particularly hard.
If an economy by 1977 produced 90% of consumer manufactured 
goods, 50% of intermediate goods and construction inputs 
and 10% of capital goods - spares - engineering products, 
and had reduced the operating input (raw materials, parts, 
spares) proportion of imports to 25% (low in African, 
moderate in global terms) it had gone a long way from the 
colonial toward the nei structure. It imported basically 
fuel, capital goods, intermediate goods, and more marginally 
food and consumer durables.
If - as is more likely than not - it has since suffered 
a sharp terms of trade deterioration, a rise in debt 
service burden and a deterioration in domestic food 
availability relative to demand, the results are catastrophic. 
Import cuts have reduced domestic manufactured goods avail­
ability by four times the foreign exchange cost 'saved', 
fuel-food-debt service take up over 75% of export earnings, 
the erosion of the manufactures tax base has hurled the 
recurrent budget into deficit fuelling unprecedented inflation, 
parallel markets grow rapidly and lack of the goods that used 
to be produced domestically cripples incentives and prevents 
even maintaining real peasant or minimum wage earner incomes. 
Precisely because the economy had gone further in domestic 
economic integration - but still had very critical import 
requirements - the multiplier effect from lpst import capacity 
is greater than for the pure export economy.
None of this invalidates nei as a strategy nor as one criteria 
for picking out what to consolidate. It does suggest that 
consolidation is the first step toward resuming or adopting 
an nei strategy and that in their initial years such strategies 
are very vulnerable to external shocks.
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Notes Toward Identifying Priority Themes
In SSA the contexts (of history, of state governing coalition 
composition, of economic structure, of exact relationship 
with the world economy, of present state of morale and of 
dilapidation, of weather, of opportunities) of states and 
their territorial economies and of major sub-units 
(geographic, ecological and social) within countries differ 
widely. No general strategy for consolidation can be drawn 
up except with a specified objective correllative of a 
particular economy at a particular point in time. Nor can 
such a strategy be prepared in any meaningful sense by a 
single intellectual or bureaucrat (or even a large mixed 
committee of them!) nor presented in a half hour talk 
(especially in a talk outside any specific African context 
and, indeed, outside SSA as a whole!).
What can usefully be done - analysis, reflection and 
identification of general themes by intellectuals and 
bureaucrats are important - is to indicate priorities.
This is important for the following reasons:
1. under conditions of extreme resource scarcity (foreign 
exchange, high and middle level personpower, fiscal 
revenues, investible surpluses, food, petroleum, products, 
etc.) priority setting, coordination and enforcement is
in itself the first priority. 'To plan is to choose' 
and to choose is to exclude the secondary or postponeable 
to include and be able to include and act on the essential 
and urgent.
2. there are a number of common priority areas which do 
apply to most - indeed perhaps all - SSA economies and 
struggles to reconstruct them today.
a . increasing the capacity utilisation and growth rates 
of goods producing sectors (including transport and 
energy);
b. defining the goals and scope of the public sector (and 
acting on that definition) in terms of the necessary 
and of the possible;
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c . creating and maintaining practicable incentive 
patterns which serve social, economic and political 
economic goals including raising production at 
acceptable real resource costs;
d. serious attention to coordinated prices policies 
at macro (e.g. wages, salaries, bank credit, 
exchange and interest rates, grower prices) as well 
as micro (e.g. relative grower prices, particular 
wage and salary differentials, producer-distributor- 
consumer prices for critical goods, rates of indirect 
taxation on particular items) level and to testing 
proposed or actual price patterns in terms of 
realism (do real resource availabilities balance 
demand at these levels) and of implied incentives
(to produce, to shift production, to smuggle...);
e. efficiency defined in terms of stated goals and progress 
toward them achieved at as low a real resource cost as 
practicable;
f. the uses and limits of external commercial borrowing;
g. the possible improvements in quantity and quality 
(i.e. relevance to priorities) of external concessional
transfers (aid);
h. increasing exports not to have export led growth but to 
reduce dependence (on begging and borrowing) and to 
finance those imports necessary for consolidation and 
national economic integration.
Producing More Goods
SSA economics must produce more goods (especially food, agri­
cultural inputs into manufacturing, basic manufactured goods 
for consumption and construction, transport, energy) absolutely 
and relative to services. This priority is not an alternative 
to sustaining or expanding or creating basic education, 
preventative and curative health, pure water or crop failure 
relief services; rather it is the necessary condition for
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sustaining or achieving them. To pose the question 
primarily in terms of alternatives (as some proponents 
either of production or of basic services do) is to mystify. 
The advocacy of expanded textile production out of existing 
capacity in Tanzania, for example, is not advocacy of 
reducing availability of pure water - it is,by its incentive 
and government revenue impact, a necessary condition for 
maintaining and expanding access to pure water.
The two basic arguments for increased goods production are 
balance and revenue base. Balance is needed in respect of 
specific goods: for example, energy, food, housing and of 
physical goods in general vis a vis services. The need for 
basic goods and services is for a balanced package - adequate 
health, education and water with inadequate food, clothing 
and fuel is as unsatisfactory as the reverse combination.
The second argument is that physical goods (including for 
this purpose energy, construction and perhaps transport) 
provide the basic surplus (public or private, fiscal or 
household) to finance the purchase of services. The govern­
ment revenue base for health, education and water depends 
primarily on industry and agriculture as does the household 
cash income available to pay for marketed services.
None of this is to argue that basic services are not productive. 
Health, education and water are among the most productive 
investments/operations in Africa. The retrospective evaluation 
of IDA shows high rates of return on projects in these categories 
and IDA integrated rural development programmes have often 
' failed'because the production technology package was unsound 
not because the infrastructure and basic services components 
failed to achieve their targets. Common sense also tells us 
that healthy, literate workers and women freed from spending 
half their time fetching wood and water will be more able and 
more motivated to produce. By that same logic, however, more 
food is needed (literate, healthy but weak from hunger is not
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a productive combination) for balance and more production of 
goods in general to restore the government revenue base to 
finance primary education, health,pure water and woodlot 
development and/or operation.
Public Sector: Priorities and Problems In Sub-Saharan Africa 
The public sector has played and will continue to play a leading 
role. This was true in the colonial period - detailed state 
interventionism not laissez faire was the order of the day - 
and is true in South Africa; it is more a matter of contextual 
necessity than ideological preference. Both historial analysis 
of Western and Central Europe - for example by Professor 
Gershenkron - and examination of how Japan, both Koreas and 
Brazil broke through to possessing major domestic industrial 
sectors and competitiveness internationally in selected lines 
indicate that late starting economic development has required 
detailed state economic intervention, extended protectionism 
and, usually, as substantial public sector role in production/ 
finance/external trade. Given the very late start, weak 
private domestic sector capacity, poor domestic savings mobilisation 
capacity and extreme openness to trade, African economic develop­
ment (whether capitalist or socialist) will require large public 
sectors - both governmental and public enterprise. The exact 
forms, sizes and emphases will ( and should) vary but, without 
public sector leadership African economic development (or even 
emergence out of recession) will not take place.
There is no general case that African public sectors do too much, 
in most cases they probably do too little. ( Globally, 
excluding consumption transfer payments, recurrent government 
expenditure is typically near 25% of national product - SSA 
levels are in that range as much as West European or South 
Asian. On transfer payments, i.e. 'welfare' as normally defined 
they are below any other region.) Nor is there any general case 
that the private sector could or would do better - especially in 
in terms of providing services to poor peasants and workers at 
prices they could afford. E.g. private sector agricultural
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marketing does not in general provide a higher share of retail 
(or export or factory) price to peasants. It may well 
substitute 'efficient' capitalist profits for sluggish 
employee wages but one must doubt whether that does much 
good for the peasant or the national economy,
The case for change rests on the demonstrable fact that many 
African public sectors do what they do very badly and do not 
seem to have clear priorities or sequences. To seek to do 
now what can be postponed (e.g. international airport upgrading) 
or what is better done by private or co-operative/local 
public enterprise units (e.g. retail shops, rural short 
distance lorry and bus transport) is disastrously expensive. 
This is true not simply because these activities themselves are 
hardly priority but even more because it means that urgent 
priorities (e.g. in macro economic policy and/or in national 
storage facilities) and key sectors in which a public enter­
prise role is critical (e.g. banking, external trade) are 
left vacant or done very badly.
Precisely because the public sector is vital - in basic 
services, in macro economic policy and market management, and 
in production/trade/finance, it must identify priorities, 
sequences and goals and constrain what is attempted within the 
limits of the possible. To fail to do this - as many SSA 
governments have failed -is to achieve less than is possible 
and to fail to build up a process of increasing public 
sector capacity and efficiency.
Because SSA economy and state resources have in many cases 
declined since 1977, there may often be a case for specific 
cutbacks in public sector activity. But this case is not 
an ideological one nor is it grounded in any belief the private 
sector will take over. Nor should it be directed primarily 
at public enterprises as such, still less at basic services. 
General administration, defense (especially in cases with 
no real threat of external aggression), retail trading, fancy 
infrastructure would seem to be the areas deserving intensive 
scrutiny for possible reductions in coverage and resource 
allocations.
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Incentives - What Motivates Who To Do What?
Of course people respond to incentives. Of course material 
incentives are important - especially to poor people. But 
to proceed from saying incentives are important to saying 
higher real grower prices and wages are everything is chopped 
logic and/ often, unworkable economics. To try to follow 
such a price/wage centered incentive strategy in SSA today 
is 'throwing money at the problem1 often with no serious 
examination of whether the money will result in more goods 
or merely more inflation.
Many SSA economies have, because of sluggish physical growth 
and falls in the purchasing power of exports, less national 
purchasing power than in 1979. Raising or even holding 
constant real grower prices and minimum wages requires 
reducing real salaries, real government expenditure and 
real enterprise (public or private) profits. Such radical, 
rapid shifts in income distribution may not be possible and - 
at least in their impact on basic services and investment 
potential - may also not be desirable. Attempts to carry 
out this approach in the face of worsening external constraints 
and domestic production in Tanzania in 1980-1981 did not 
work. Grower prices - as a whole - were held constant in 
real terms, minimum wages eroded moderately, real government 
spending was cut as were real salaries. But this did not 
allow regaining external, general internal, or fiscal 
balance and by 1982 was clearly no longer sustainable.
For export crops it is unclear why higher real prices are
desirable on economic logic grounds. If the global 
purchasing power of raw coffee has fallen by over two thirds
since 1977 (as it has), why should (and how can) its domestic
purchasing power in an African economy be raised? To do so 
is to violate the basic principles of market economies. It 
may, on tactical grounds, be plausible planning economics - 
albeit managing incentives to encourage more investment in 
losers is not a planning principle of general, long term 
validity. Free market economic logic it is not.
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There are other incentives than price - and ones which SSA 
States should be able to deploy at bearable real resource 
costs within an operation - rehabilitation - consolidation 
strategy. Examples in respect of peasants include:
a. payment in cash on purchase at buying points accesible 
to peasants and with buyers present at frequent, known 
in advance intervals;
b. provision for sale (via shops) of goods peasants want 
on which to spend their cash income;
c . basic education, health and pure water services.
These are critical incentives - at least if one is to believe 
what peasants say when asked. They are also incentives which 
can be provided if priority attention is given to them. The 
point about peasant statements has wider implications - 
actually asking open ended questions about priorities to 
peasants is not a normal part of framing incentive or 
integrated rural development policies and projects (least of 
all by donor agencies advocating participation and targeting 
on the needs of the poorest of the poor). Doing so often 
demonstrates the practical dangers of speculating abstractly 
about incentives - in one Tanzania region the top priority in 
a significant proportion of villages was 'vermin control'
(ie. either shotguns and cartriges or government employees 
with them to reduce baboon damage to crops), not one 
fancies a result anybody predicted (nor, unfortunately, one 
the Kigoma integrated Rural Development Project took seriously).
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Price Policy: Macro-economic Management
Price policy does not refer solely or even primarily to 
price control. Rather it relates to macro-economic 
management: wages and salaries, grower prices, indirect
tax levels, foreign exchange price (exchange rate), 
manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer price structures, interest 
rates, domestic bank credit formation and their interaction 
with each other and an overall monetary demand/physical 
supply balance.
Since no state in the world actually practices true 
laissez faire in respect to price management, it is most 
unlikely SSA states will move in that direction. Nor - 
even in the case of states arguably engaged in processes 
of transition to socialism - do they show any tendency 
to attempt generalized material balances planning. 
Therefore, the remaining option - market management 
largely through price management - and the effectiveness 
of its use is central to the macro economic impact (for 
better or for worse) of state policy.
Certain general criteria for such market management can 
be set out:
a. consistency of main prices relative to each other.
This consistency need not be at global market price 
relativities - which apply literally in no country - 
but if it is very far out of line specific problems 
of foreign exchange price (exchange rate) and foreigi 
trade management must be faced and managed if either 
external or internal balance is to be maintained;
b . consistency of total - and key sectoral - monetary 
demand with real resource supply. Unless the claims 
on real resources add up to the real resources 
available overall, by key sector (eg. construction, 
government tax revenue and recurrent expenditure) 
and vis a vis foreign markets/sources (eg. 'basic' 
external balance) there will be specific or general 
shortages, inflationary pressures, domestic parallel 
markets and illicit external trade/currency trans­
actions. Some such examples are inevitable - no
-  16 -
price setting, including 'free markets', moves instantly 
and totally effectively - the question is how general 
and severe they are. In most SSA economics today the 
answer to that question is 'easy' - very general, 
very severe;
c. moderately efficient in the sense of avoiding gross 
shortages and underutilized scarce resources (eg. 
textile plant at 30% of capacity and textile supply at 
50% of what the domestic market would buy at prices 
consistent with profits to the mills), rapid (over 20%) 
and hyper (over 50%) inflation and huge drains in 
administration and management personnel. The last 
point is important - very detailed, low level inter­
vention and using management to try to block the results 
of price policies which do not 'add up' are lavish, 
usually inefficient uses of scarce personnel. They 
are very cost ineffective - whatever their theoretical 
or even practical gains, eg. to urge central governments 
to collect charges (especially volume related charges) 
from urban and rural water standpipe users is normally 
a nearly pure example of inefficiency. The cost in 
terms of administration (administrators and institutional 
capacity) is high and the net (collections less 
collection costs) revenue trivial. Both cross 
subsidies (high rates on the - richer - piped water to 
home users to cover urban standpipe costs) and annual 
local charges levied at village level on all user house­
holds (whether literally to cover water system main­
tenance or other locally determined projects) are likely 
to be infinitely more efficient as to management cost 
and to have other side benefits.
Concentration on testing price management for consistency,
adding up and <cost efficiency has more to offer than
theoretical or theological arguments phrased in terms of
revealed truth and permanant verities (which in practice
often turn out to be obscurantist half truths and highly
variable falsehoods). This is true in small (eg. rural 
water charges) and in large (eg. interest rates). It is
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particularly relevant to exchange rates. The proponents of 
50 - 75% devaluations as low cost, single instrument 'cures' 
and those of no devaluation, now or at any level of domestic/ 
global price imbalance are 'like minded' and mutually 
strengthen each others crude, reductionist theological 
perceptions of what is actually normally a complex, time 
and space bounded issue in macro-price management whose 
possible workable answers are actually workable only 
within a package of other price and real resource avail­
ability measures. To approach this type of economic 
management exercise as one in which there is any universal 
revealed truth is to approach it in a way likely to contribute 
much more to the problems than to their solutions.
Material Balances, Muddled Markets and All That
Markets do clear but whether they do so smoothly, swiftly and 
in ways efficient either for overall national production 
levels or for acceptable levels of real income for poor 
peasants and workers is another matter altogether. How 
badly they perform in the second set of issues is open to 
debate and varies from context to context. However it is 
widely agreed that 'free' markets perform relatively badly if:
a. uncertainty is high and information inadequate;
b. physical availability of key goods and services is below 
levels necessary to sustain recent past levels of economic 
and social activity;
c. income distribution is relatively unequal and liquid asset 
distribution even more so;
d. substantial demand for foreign exchange relates to a 
desire to 'expatriate' (export) capital;
e. certain areas or markets (eg. rural) have high risks and 
physical access problems and available goods can be sold 
at a substantial profit in more accessible, low risk (eg. 
major city) ones.
All of these conditions apply in most SSA economies today. 
Therefore, some use of direct ('material balances') resource
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management is necessary. Again this is not primarily a 
matter of ideology or of technical preferences but of contextual 
necessity. Three critical examples can be cited:
Rural goods supplies (eg. textiles, hoes, kerosene, cooking 
oil, salt, sugar, tea, cement, roofing sheet) are unlikely 
to be supplied by the 'free' market. Bad roads, limited 
transport, lags in distribution and payment, total goods 
supplies below large city demand at prices guaranteeing high, 
prompt profits,create a situation in which the rural markets 
are not worth the risk and bother to dynamic, flexible, efficient 
(at maximizing risk free profits) entrepreneurs (including 
public sector national market manufacturers and wholesalers).
The need to see that such incentive goods do reach rural areas 
is evident on production as well as distribution grounds. 
Therefore, allocations of basic commodities to stores in 
district centres (whether via public or private wholesale and 
transport enterprises) are likely to be essential in a 
substantial number of SSA economies. Experience in Mozambique 
and Tanzania suggests that for 20 - 30 basic goods such 
"rationing by region" can be made to work when given serious 
priority in product allocation.
Petroleum product allocation must include both geographic 
and use criteria. Market forces alone would result in a 
totally disproportionate share going to large city saloon 
car users and far too little to up country lorry and bus 
operators, manufacturing and processing units,poor household 
lighting, and power stations. So long as prices are set in 
a pattern allowing profits on all products sold to all 
districts, private (and public) petroleum products wholesale 
companies will cooperate in geographic and sectoral rationing. 
Individual private user rationing of gasoline (as opposed to 
first come first served) is unlikely to save much gasoline 
but may have some value in terms of equity among saloon car 
owners or psychological value as a very evident imposition 
of sacrifices on elites.
Foreign exchange allocation by use - in terms of using and 
maintaining national productive capacity - cannot be left 
purely to the market. This is particularly true if luxury
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and amenity consumer goods (especially durables ) are 
very scarce while a substantial number of households have 
cash to spend. Under such circumstances brandy, cigars, 
Mercedes will yield higher margins and quicker returns 
than inputs into agriculture, manufacturing, road transport 
or basic services.
These examples may - to many readers - suggest a more general 
need for broader backup planning on a material balances 
basis and/or for altering income and iiquid asset distri­
bution. What they do demonstrate is an immediate, non- 
ideological case for non-price allocation of certain goods 
under conditions of crisis and uncertainty.
Efficiency: For What and How?
Efficiency must be defined in terms of go als, eg. rural 
income levels, urban employment growth, enterprise profit, 
export expansion. Goods are usually multiple and partially 
complementary. On the whole academic and aid agency analysts 
have come to accept both of these not very remarkable 
conclusions. The problem is what is to be done about them.
Too often the result is either paralysis or an attempt to 
equate efficiency with enterprise micro profitability on the 
basis that there should always be a single, overriding, 
measurable goal. Neither is a necessary or desirable 
result. That most decisions require taking into account 
how much is achieved toward several, not fully consistent 
goals, seems perpetually to surprise academicians.
Everybody else - from the peasant interplanting a field, 
through the housewife shopping and the Treasury analyst working 
out possible tax rate changes, to the Prime Minister selecting a 
cabinet - knows that such is the nature of decisions and 
that trying to reduce goals to one falsities the position 
rather than simplifying it.
Operationally efficiency requires:
a. consistency among targets and among instruments for 
achieving progress toward them;
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b. possibility of achieving minimum acceptable progress 
toward targets and operating programmes and policies 
specified at least to some minimum plausible level 
given probable real resource availabilities;
c. sub-targets related to each goal and time period to 
allow decision takers to select 'tradeoff ratios', 
'minimum acceptable levels' and 'preferred packages' 
which are roughly possible/consistent.
General theoretical discussion about 'efficiency has social 
content' versus 'efficiency means profit' often create an 
unholy alliance against taking action on consistency/ 
possibility/sub-target improvement. Such improvement can 
frequently be pursued by easily identifiable, non- 
ideoiogical means which are little affected by the abstruse 
debates about the ultimate nature or natures of efficiency. 
These include:
a. better accounting - a precondition either for financial 
management or accountability;
b . avoiding 'uses' of resources which serve no plausible 
aim, eg. bad export marketing which looses 20% on 
average of potential export proceeds;
c. not using two cross cancelling policies, eg. Treasury 
dropping 10% export tax to encourage output and local 
councils - marketing bodies - rural agencies insisting on 
new charges adding up to the equivalent of 15% 
additional export tax;
d. actually setting targets of output, unit cost, etc., 
and testing results against targets;
e. ensuring that all government and public enterprise 
units are (in name and practice)accountable to a 
domestic public sector body and ultimately (and if 
possible directly) to workers, consumers and tax payers.
(Accountability of a department or enterprise to an 
aid agency to the exclusion of a domestic body usually 
means no accountability at all and certainly prevents 
any consistency in public sector macro-management.)
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Attention to these and similar approaches could raise SSA 
public sector efficiency markedly. Theoretical debates 
about multiplicity of goals and technical mathematical 
programming constraints are a very inefficient way to 
tackle the problem.
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Borrowing, Bridging and Bankruptcy
For SSA as a whole ,and for all but two or three SSA economies 
individually ,commercial borrowing cannot be the way out. Had 
1979-80 been followed over 1981-82 by a global trade and 
commodity price recovery like 1976-1977 things might have been 
different; bridging loans of up to 30 per cent of annual 
exports at 10-12 per cent repayable over five years might have 
been prudent for - perhaps - half of SSA economies. But 1976- 
77 was not repeated, nor will it be.
Long term commercial loans to African states and companies are 
simply not available. Short term bank loans (also not now in 
fact available to most SSA states in a volume even vaguely 
approaching their trade deficits) are under present and recent 
past situations, like opium» addictive debilitating, deadly.
A state which seeks to borrow net equal to a quarter of its 
imports on 5 year repayment, 18-20 per cent interest terms 
will find that by year 5 annual debt service exceeds total 
exports, total debt is about three times annual exports and 
gross borrowing required one and a half times exports. Collapse 
may be put off for a few years but at the price of making it 
more certain and deeper.
Under conditions of extreme external imbalance the only 
prudent commercial loans are those for projects which will - 
on cautious estimates - generate net foreign exchange in excess 
of interest and repayment over the life of the loans.
Some major export and production gap filling import saving 
projects can pass that test. Most suppliers credit, however, 
has been for hotels, airports, capital cities and other 
projects which cannot. SSA states were unwise to contract it 
and industrial economy (capitalist and socialist) governments 
and financial institutions to make it so readily available to 
back construction and machinery companies. The heritage of 
these attempts to protect imports and investment on the SSA 
side and to protect exports and employment in the North is - 
and for half a decade will be - reduced SSA import capacity, 
payments delays and, in some cases default (and as a result 
reduced North exports and increased financial institution 
portfolio risk).
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Apart from the special problems of external debt servicing, 
recent past interest rates (16-20 per cent nominal, 6-10 per 
cent real) are a major deterrent to productive investment.
Very high interest charges are acceptable only for investments 
which are relatively certain to have high early profits and 
cash flows - a characteristic much more commonly associated with 
speculative ventures than production. This is especially true 
since the money price of exportables cannot be counted on to 
rise parallel to inflation so that on borrowings to finance 
them the nominal rate is, in practice, the real rate as well.
Aid: Quantity, Quality, Usability
A massive increase in aid is highly desirable. It is also 
highly unlikely. The Brandt programme is not surviving.
This does not mean that the SSA governments, the World Bank 
or the Nordic aid agencies should cease to argue the case for 
more transfers. It does say that no SSA government should do 
its calculations on the basis of increased concessional resource 
inflows until these are negotiated and signed. Nor should 
anybody promise (except from his own agency's pocket and within 
its means to pay) more concessional finance in return for policy 
changes entailing short term costs. Such promises are at 
present irresponsible. The government believing them and 
creating a programme requiring unpleasant policies and 
additional concessional finance to offset their worst effects 
and to finance their positive side is only too likely to be 
stuck with unpleasant, by themselves unsustainable, policies 
and not get the added concessional finance to make them bearable 
and workable.
Therefore, the main way of making aid contribute more to 
reversing SSA economies slide into disintegration is to improve 
its quality and usability. Bluntly that means less project 
finance for new capacity which cannot be used and more finance 
(programme and project) for operating, maintaining and 
rehabilitating existing core economic and basic service sectors1 
capacity utilisation and capital stock levels. A checklist of 
priorities appropriate to most SSA economies is fairly easy:
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a. key operating inputs (eg. pharmaceuticals for health 
services, dyes and chemicals for textiles, paper for 
textbooks, phosphate for fertilizer plants, sulphates 
for plant disease control);
b. critical maintenance items (eg. spares for lorries and 
for mechanical workshops, switchgear and fuses for 
power systems, roadrollers and bitumen for main highways 
and shovels for feeder roads);
c. fixed asset rehabilitation (eg. half destroyed roads, 
derelict lagging and woodmilling operations, broken 
down port and rail equipment;
d. gap filling projects (eg. power transmission lines to 
utilize hydro instead of oil power, production allowing 
major export increases, discovery and exploitation of 
oil, training to fill identified middle level person- 
power gaps such as artisans and accountants).
Whether funding is called project (eg. "Highway Rehabilitation" 
or "Teaching Materials Development") or programme, recurrent 
cost or balance of payments support is of little practical 
importance. That it be targeted to areas critical to ha.lting 
production decline and capital stock deterioration and that 
it be quick disbursing are essential.
Similarly, there are exceptions (some assets are not worth 
maintaining, some production is not priority, some new 
projects - especially those with very low foreign exchange 
costs in construction or operation - are worth having) and 
qualifications (eg. not all countries are in the same position, 
key sectors vary) and limitations (eg. after consolidation 
it should resume forward progress - at that point capacity 
utilisation support should be phased back toward capacity 
creation). But the main point - fully accepted by few 
SSA governments or aid agencies and fully acted on by none - 
is simple. Under present African economic conditions much 
more external help should go to operating, maintaining and 
rehabilitating existing - but threatened - capacity and 
substantially less to creating new capacity which cannot 
be used because of foreign exchange and fiscal constraints.
Such assistance is not unemployment relief or handouts -
it is/ in many cases, the only way Africans and African 
production units can employ their existing local resources/ 
capital stock and labour.
Export or Borrow, Beg and Collapse
The bottom line for most SSA economies today is more earned 
foreign exchange that is more exports. Without more exports 
it will continue to be impossible to operate or maintain the 
existing economy i.e. to sustain, let alone increase real 
grower prices and wages.
The need for more exports is greatest in the case of a 
government pursuing a national economic integration strategy. 
To launch such a strategy with imports dominated by food, 
fuel and inputs into agriculture and manufacturing, already 
so low as to hold material product 25% to 33% below historic 
capacity utilisation levels and only 40% to 60% covered by 
exports is to spit into the wind.
An nei strategy requires structural change. It requires 
more construction and machinery - i.e. more imports 
absolutely and usually relative to total uses of resources. 
Only with a long time lag (20 or 30 years) can it be expected 
to achieve really sharp reductions of imports to total 
investment plus consumption ratios.
Thus the precondition for a sustained nei strategy is a 
healthy balance of payments including a dynamic earned import 
capacity (i.e. exports). Unfortunately 'delinking' as 
heard by decision takers - and as often preached - has 
argued the reverse: import substitute and let exports look
out for themselves or (worse) 'delink' from exports and 
national production will look out for itself.
'Delinking' from exports first is the surest way to block - 
not to implement - a national economic integration strategy. 
Shifting from exports to grants or loans to pay for imports 
does not increase self-reliance I The very large body of 
1960s and 1970s intellectual advice which, at best, has 
failed to make this point and, at worst, has argued the
1
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reverse has much to answer for. As I warned in 1970: 
to restructure for economic self reliance requires additional 
imports, these must be paid for, the most self reliant way 
of paying is from exports, if exports are allowed to stagnate 
the nation - and its self reliance strategy - will be delivered 
bound hand and foot into the hands of its creditors.
Evidently I did not argue hard or convincingly enough to 
overcome the loud chorus of denunciation of that line of 
argument as neo-colonial. To argue for raising exports is 
not necessarily to advocate an export led growth strategy.
Nor is it necessarily to argue that investible surplus 
must come from exports. As it happens, the author doubts 
the viability of either proposition for a majority of SSA 
economies now or in the foreseeable future.
The essential purpose of exports is to pay for imports.
Any strategy - especially in a small economy or sub-region 
(eg. Botswana or even Tanzania, SADCC) - will require 
imports to sustain capacity utilisation, maintenance and 
rehabilitation, new investment in capacity augmentation 
and structural change. These must be financed by loans, 
grants, foreign investment and exports. Availability, 
debt servicing burden and maintaining control over 
political economic decisions limit how much investment, 
grants and loans can or should be used. The remaining figure 
is the level of exports required for the viability of the 
national development strategy. Its rise over time is the 
necessary rate of growth of export value. Especially if 
the initial economic structure is very fragmented and terms 
of trade evolve badly, export growth at least as rapid as 
that of national product is likely to be necessary. With 
positively evolving terms of trade, high rates of real 
concessionary finance flow growth or industrial sectors 
where capital as well as operating input requirements has 
been reduced to 20% of total value, a lower rate would be 
adequate. But mere will is not adequate - the People's 
Democratic Republic of Korea over 1955-1975 needed a 
rate of growth of imports and exports greater than that of 
gross national product to sustain a national economic 
transformation strategy which - whatever else it was -
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was austerely inward looking and placed a high value on 
self reliance. If that was true for the PDRK few African 
economies and governments can hope to do better in terms of 
economising on import needs and export requirements.
Similarly exports need not yield investible surpluses.
What they must do is allow investible surpluses to be 
transformed into operating and investment goods not 
produced locally. For example, what coffee must do in 
respect to Tanzania is to generate import capacity. It 
need not pay any export tax, provide any marketing 
authority surplus or give rise to major savings out of 
or taxes on grower incomes. So long as taxes on and 
savings from all economic sectors are adequate and export 
proceeds allow their transformation into the specific • 
goods needed^ both external and domestic balance are attainable 
even if the export sector itself generates no surplus at all. 
(Given the horrendous global purchasing power loss of most of 
Africa's agricultural exports since 1975-77 it is quite 
fatuous to suppose that they now generate or could generate 
substantial fiscal or investible surpluses. The high noon 
of marketing board surpluses and export taxes was probably 
in the 1950s and its brief efflorescence in the 1976-77 
beverage boom has already faded in all but a few countries.)
However, to underline the necessity of export (earned import 
capacity) growth and the empirical implausibility of a 
primary export led growth strategy for SSA as a region 
does not answer the question "What is to be done?" There 
probably is no general answer for all SSA economies.
Several approaches can be identified which - in varying 
degrees - could break export stagnation for a majority:
a. primary product export rehabilitation, for example
cacao in Ghana, cashew in Tanzania including transport, 
processing, procurement as well as direct production 
inputs and incentives;
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b. new or massively expanded resource based exports with 
plausible future market potential, for example coal 
in Mozambique, iron and steel in Zimbabwe, paper and 
amonia/urea (from natural gas) in Tanzania.
(Admitedly the short term market outlook for coal, 
fertilizer, paper and iron/steel is none too good but 
the medium term is distinctly better than for, say, 
coffee, tea, cocoa);
c . processing/manufacturing existing raw material exports 
to capture additional value added, for example
cacao butter-powder-paste in partial replacement of 
cocoa beans, wood products/lumber from logs, shoes/ 
leather products/leather from hides and skins, paper 
from pulp, metal from metallic ore concentrates.
How much can be achieved how fast is a question which can 
only be answered in a particular country context. In the 
cases in which there is currently quantitative export 
stagnation and export cover of imports of 40-60%,the most 
which can be hoped for is to achieve a positive trend increase 
of, say, 5% a year in export earnings and to reduce the trade 
gap deficit to, say, 20-30% of imports over the next few 
years. Development of more coherent medium term export 
development strategies parallel to implementing more 
readily identifiable rehabilitation, processing and new 
natural resource based exports is a priority for the 
consolidation phase to allow a proper import capacity 
development element in subsequent renewed development - 
especially if focused on national/regional political 
economic integration (or self reliance) lines. In few 
cases will 'more of the same' export mix be a sound 
strategy by itself, nor will the prudent additions usually 
all be self evident.
Export promotion is not an alternative to import 
substitution, nor is there any necessary linkage between 
it and trade liberalisation. Import substitution in the 
specific sense of reducing levels of imports needed to 
operate the existing economies at present o r (better) 
higher capacity utilisation levels are a priority. What
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items are appropriate depends on national ecology, and 
acquired comparative advantage in skills, knowledge and 
plant. Barley may be a good example in much of East and 
Southern Africa (beer is_ widely consumed, an incentive 
good and a major fiscal instrument however much 
development theorists deride it!) and light engineering 
(spares, construction inputs) fairly generally. Import 
substitution in the broader sense of reducing import 
needs if the plant and economy can be operated at full 
capacity and the alternative to local production is 
finished products imports is not a priority during 
consolidation. It requires more total imports (not less) 
as well as overall economic buoyancy levels not currently 
attainable.
Trade liberalisation as a general or universal proportion 
rests on the assumption of relatively full employment 
globally and nationally. As a specific argument against 
protectionism it assumes that the growth of industrial 
sectors behind high tariffs (eg. USA, Germany, Japan, 
Korea, Brazil) has been warped or slowed - not made 
possible or accelerated by protection.
Clearly neither the world economy nor SSA economies in 
any way approximate to full employment. Protection 
(including quantitative allocation of import capacity) 
can therefore lead to higher domestic output than a 
liberal trade regime if it causes employment of domestic 
plant, raw materials and labour which would otherwise be 
unemployed. For example to license the import of sulphur 
to go with local phosphates, water, power, factory and 
labour to produce fertilizer both directly (in mining and 
manufacturing) and indirectly (in agriculture) raises 
material output relative to what it would be either if the 
licenses were auctioned and brandy or refrigerators 
imported or were a smaller volume of finished fertilizer 
imported. At present in Africa - as would have been the 
case in Singapore or Korea or Brazil in the early 1960s -
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wholesale removal of industrial protection would mean 
wholesale deindustrialisation not selective restructuring 
of the sector. Under present circumstances the plausible 
rule of thumb is nearer to "some production is better than 
no production" than to "any protection is bad protection".
However, trade restriction - like export promotion - 
should be selective. The aim is to generate 
external balance consistent with political economic 
development at as low a real resource cost as possible. 
Export subsidies and import barriers are likely to be 
needed both to help counter the dumping of global 
unemployment into SSA and to follow the historic path of 
most 'late starting1 economies of protecting the 
economy until some sectors become fully competitive. But 
efficiency in achieving external balance requires far more 
hardheaded analysis of the true resource costs of subsidised 
exports (eg. tea and tobacco in Tanzania) and of very high 
import protection (eg. textiles and tins in Kenya, razor 
blades, detergents and toothpaste in Tanzania). This is 
not an area in which it is hard to identify 'best' and 
'worst' cases (allowing selective promotion and conversion 
or excision) so long as one avoids theological revealed 
truths about the evil of all trade restriction or the 
justifiability of all industrial protection.
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Looking Ahead: Pessimism of the Intellect
What types of SSA economies seem reasonably politically 
economically viable in the short run? The answer is not 
none : five categories - of which four have, or recently 
have had actual examples - seem to be definable.
The first two categories are:
a. economies which have 'found' enough petroleum to cover 
domestic needs and to bolster export earnings (e.g. Cameroon, 
Ivory Coast) but not enough to produce illusions of unlimited 
wealth;
b. economies in the well known 'initial export opening up boom1 
in which exports explode from a low base pulling the whole 
economy along for a decade or two before plateauing out 
(e.g. Gold Coast 1890-1910, Sudan 1945-1960, Tanzania 1955- 
1965, Ivory Coast 1960-1975, Malawi 1965-1978, Botswana 
1967-198?) . This period evidently does not necessarily
lay the foundations for longer term development, but it 
does provide a fairly resilient economy while it lasts.
The problem with these two categories is that will and resource 
reallocation alone cannot allow a government to move its economy 
into one of them. The case for petroleum exploration exists but, 
even where chances of discovery are fair,the time lag is likely 
to be long. (e.g. Tanzania 1969-1982 with no actual petroleum 
finds) counting only the period of the modern state backed 
exploration effort and not the 1940's and 1950's prehistory).
As to an initial export opening up boom this has already 
happened in most cases. To 'repeat' it either requires a 
major new export (the Nigerian oil boom was perhaps an 
example of a second 'opening up') or a revival of a totally 
collapsed export sector (e.g. Cacao in Ghana?). For a majority 
of SSA economies this route to viability does not exist.
The other three categories are - perhaps - more readily 
'achievable':
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c. preserving a significant export enclave and supporting 
services to it; using enclave revenues to satisfy the 
'needs' of a cohesive political - TNC - security force 
elite; abandoning the rest of the polity and economy; 
securing external guarantors who (for their economic or 
security reasons) see a collapse of the economy's 
government as unacceptable. The classic e.g. is Zaire - 
Citoyen Mobutu's regime is viable in its own political 
economic terms and worth sustaining in those of its 
foreign friends;
d. allowing creative, flexible, dynamic African capitalists 
a free hand to organise scarce resources under conditions 
of scarcity without interference by (and preferably with 
support from) the state. Uganda magendo in 1979-1980 met 
this test; 16th century capitalism and very nasty but 
accumulating, diversifying, beginning to build back from 
exchange into production. Uganda of the magendo godfathers 
('mafutamyingi!) was more economically viable than the 
present death in life deadlock of a state with just 
enough backing to block a magendo style 'medieval' cap­
italist development but far too little power or foreign 
exchange to recapture cpntrol over or direct the economy
in any positive sense;
e. a populist or proto-socialist variant of "d" - basic 
abandoning of urban and industrial structures (90% of 
townspeople back to the land), a national scarcity economy 
centred on food and limited inputs into defense forces and 
health, quasi material balances planning at district level, 
a long, slow return toward a more complex structure of 
production and use. This was the basic economic model
of the "Khmer Rouge' albeit one badly warped in practice 
by the irreconcileable fractions within that regime.
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The problem with these three models is not their unattain­
ability. It is their sheer nastiness. Each requires 
writing off the welfare of a very substantial majority 
of the territory's people. Each requires extreme 
repression to survive. (True, "e" might not if the 
workers and peasants were 'conscious' it would lead to 
gains for them and/or their grandchildren. But, workers 
and peasants do not have any such consciousness so a 
repressive elite would be vital to operate such a regime.) 
Even the most ardent supporters of African capitalism 
hesitate to call for support to or emulation of one of 
Africa's most dynamic, innovative and strongly based 
capitalist classes - Uganda magendo! But, on present 
trends, Africa will be littered with examples of such 
economies and perhaps also with a less malignant variant 
of "c" where aid supports a non-functional (but also 
non-exploitative because it has no power to exploit) elite 
at the centre and the rest of the people survive ( or 
starve) more or less on their own with only a thin 
semblance of an organised public or private sector.
(The cynical might suggest that Guinea-Bissau and Upper 
Volta had achieved this type of 'stability'.)
Optimism of the Will
Fairly evidently the types of political economic stability 
in SSA one can rationally posit or describe are either 
attainable only for a few (eg. locate oil, have an export 
boom) or are unacceptable both in terms of the interests 
of the territories1 own workers and peasants and of the 
goals of Nordic aid agencies. Therefore, the question 
'Africa out of recession how?1 remains as crucial and the 
answers to it as unclear in late 1982 as in 1979 when the 
looming spectre of generalised collapse was first seen.
There are as yet no coherent strategic answers which link 
to operational measures for implementation. The 'Lagos 
Plan1 presents a consistent,arguably correct set of goals 
for 2000 but gives no clue how to survive to 1985.
'Accelerated Development1 revives the 'private sector, primary 
export led growth1 led strategies of the 1890s or 1930s 
or 1950s with no very clear long term goods. That might 
be acceptable as a consolidation out of recession approach 
except for the inconvenient facts that its export engine 
of growth as described seems unlikely to be functional in 
the 1980s and the cumulative impact of its proposals on 
basic services and income distribution would probably wipe 
out most of the achievements of the 1960s and 1970s.
The main body of these remarks has not offered a 'third way'. 
Rather it has sought to identify themes and approaches that 
may be useful in constructing national consolidation 
strategies to lay foundations for resuming dynamic development 
in the second half of the 1980s. (In broad terms that 
renewed development could well be along 'Lagos Plan' 
lines.) By the same token, these themes and approaches 
may assist Nordic aid agencies in selecting projects, 
programmes and policies to support.
This is hardly a message of great optimism or of great 
certainty - in a quarter century the author has never been 
less sure what would be viable in Africa from the point of
i
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view of Africans nor less sanguine about the near term 
course of events. But nor is it a message calling for 
folded hands and resignation. Much was achieved in the 
1960s and 1970s. Several of the weaknesses which threaten 
that achievement are identifiable. A number of African 
states and peoples are fighting hard against collapse.
The vision of a generalisation of Zairian style enclave 
elite stability, the creative capitalism of Uganda 
magendo and the paralysing stagnation of Upper Volta or 
Guinea-Bissau to all of Sub-Saharan Africa should in 
itself be an incentive to remain in the company of those 
Africans who can at least categorize themselves as 
'undefeated because we have gone on trying1.
